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JEFF W. REISIG DISTRICT ATTORNEY OF YOLO COUNTY By: Garrett Hamilton/173423 Deputy District Attorney 301 Second Street Woodland, California 95695 Telephone: (530) 666-8180 DA File Number: 08H03355 Attorney for People

FILED
YOLO SUPERIOR COURT

By Cornett Deputy

# SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF YOLO

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA,

Plaintiff,

vs.

Marco Antonio Topete,

.

Dept. 6 Case No. 08-3355

People's Opposition to Defendant's Noticed Motion for Pretrial Discovery Compliance

Date: November 25, 2009

Time: 8:30 a.m.

Dept: 6

Defendant(s)

To the Honorable Judge Paul K Richardson, the defendant, and Counsel for the defendant, Mr. Hayes H. Gable III and Thomas A. Purtell:

Please take note that at the above time and place the People will move the court to deny the defendant's motion.

#### Defense Requested Item # 1

The People object to this requested item, and feel it is outside of our statutory and constitutional discovery obligations. The People are unaware of any authority for this request. The People object to this request on vagueness grounds, and are unaware of how anyone would or should interpret

the phrase "substantive information". The people are unaware of any authority for this request, which basically requests that the prosecution turn over every single document that every agency involved in this case has on the case.

The prosecution is not required to canvass police agencies for possible discovery for the defendant. As stated by the California Supreme Court: "[A]ll court-ordered discovery is governed exclusively by-and is barred except as provided by-the discovery chapter newly enacted by Proposition 115. (§§ 1054, subd. (e), 1054.5, subd. (a).)" (In re Littlefield (1993) 5 Cal.4th 122, 129.)

The prosecutor's obligation extends under statute only to information "in the possession of the prosecuting attorney or if the prosecuting attorney knows it to be in the possession of the investigating agencies." "[T]he prosecution has no general duty to seek out, obtain, and disclose all evidence that might be beneficial to the defense. (See In re Koehne (1960) 54 Cal.2d 757, 759 ["the law does not impose upon law enforcement agencies the requirement that they take the initiative, or even any affirmative action, in procuring the evidence deemed necessary to the defense of an accused"]; People v. Hogan (1982) 31 Cal.3d 815, 851 [There is no general duty on the part of the police or the prosecution to obtain evidence, conduct any tests, or "'gather up everything which might eventually prove useful to the defense.'"].)" (Littlefield, supra, 5 Cal.4th at 135.)

This limitation is supported by the reasoning of cases which have addressed this issue before the adoption of Proposition 115:

From an examination of the record of the hearing on the motion, it appears that the prosecution did not have such information; however, the defense in essence argued that it would be easier for the prosecution to obtain it and transfer it to the defense. Thus, had defendant's motion been granted, compliance would have required the prosecution to prepare the case for the defense. This is an obligation not imposed by the law.

(People v. Gurtenstein (1977) 69 Cal.App.3d 441, 449; see also People v. Cohen (1970) 12 Cal.App.3d 298, 323.)

The prosecutor has no duty to actively investigate the facts and circumstances of the case for the benefit of the accused. (People v. Beagle (1972) 6 Cal.3d 441, 450 451; People v. Gurtenstein, supra, 69 Cal.App.3d at p. 449.) Nor are the People required to make a complete and detailed accounting to the defense of all police investigative work on a case. (Moore v. Illinois (1972) 408 U.S. 786, 795; People v. Nation (1980) 26 Cal.3d 169, 175.)

Defendant cites the case of *People v. Riser* (1956) 47 Cal.2d 566, 585, for this and nearly every other discovery request herein. Defendant misconstrues *Riser*. *Riser* held that although actual statements made by a prosecution witness should have been disclosed to a defendant, the failure to do so was harmless error. (*Id.* at 589.) Defendant, however, gloms onto

part of one sentence of the *Riser* court's analysis and then describes it as that court's "holding": "Absent some governmental requirement that information be kept confidential for the purposes of effective law enforcement, the state has no interest in denying the accused access to all evidence that can throw light on issues in the case...." (*Id.* at 586.)

Clearly, the above does not purport to state a new discovery rule (i.e., discover everything that may "throw light on issues") that would supplant the actual discovery rules set forth by Brady and Penal Code 1054, et seq. Nor has the above ever been recognized by any Court as making such a new discovery rule. Further, even Riser recognized that discovery of documents cannot be compelled just because of the possibility of their containing relevant material: "There must be more than a mere possibility that the statements when produced will contain contradictory matter and be in such a form that they can be used to impeach, but the chance that it may turn out eventually that they cannot be used for this purpose should not block production at the threshold." (Id. at 587.)

# Defense Requested Item #2

The People object to this request as outside our discovery obligations, and on vagueness grounds. It would be impossible for us to know the names and addresses "of all persons who claim to be witnesses to any transaction or event constituting part of..." as requested. If the prosecution even attempted to embark on an adventure to determine this answer, we would probably have to violate the gag order in this case.

Here again, defendant cites *Riser* for this discovery request. Neither *Riser* nor any other case or authority says that the prosecution must perform an investigation for the defendant. As stated above: (1) *Riser* does not support defendant's position, (2) the Supreme Court in *Littlefield*, among others, explains that the prosecution is not required to "gather up everything which might eventually prove useful to the defense," (*Littlefield*, 5 Cal.4<sup>th</sup> at 135) and (3) 1054.5 precludes the defense from inventing new discovery obligations.

# Defense Requested Item #3

The People object to this request as outside our discovery obligations, vague as phrased, and on exactly the same grounds of Requested Item #2. The logistics of how one would attempt to comply with this request are unknown to this attorney.

As stated above: (1) Riser does not support defendant's position, (2) the Supreme Court in Littlefield, among others, explains that the prosecution is not required to "gather up everything which might eventually prove useful to the defense," (Littlefield, 5 Cal.4<sup>th</sup> at 135) and (3) 1054 does not require prosecution to gather facts not within knowledge of prosecution team and 1054.5 precludes the defense from inventing new discovery obligations.

# Defense Requested Item #4

The People assume that this request goes to non law enforcement people only. The law applying to rap sheets and dissemination thereof is governed by statue in California[PC 11076, 11081, 11105(b), 11141-11143]. Improper disclosure is a misdemeanor[PC11141-11142]. Rap sheets have all kinds of

personal information on people that is totally outside of our obligations under Brady. It is the People's intention to search the records of non-law enforcement material witnesses and disclose to the defense only the information that could pertain to Brady, for instance dates and locales of arrests and convictions.

If the court orders the People to run rap sheets of people and turn them over to the defense, we will. However, the People don't think it is appropriate in light of the above.

As stated above: (1) Riser does not support defendant's position, (2) the Supreme Court in Littlefield, among others, explains that the prosecution is not required to "gather up everything which might eventually prove useful to the defense," (Littlefield, 5 Cal.4<sup>th</sup> at 135) and (3) 1054 does not require prosecution to gather facts not within knowledge of prosecution team and 1054.5 precludes the defense from inventing new discovery obligations.

## Defense Requested Item #5

The People intend to comply with our Brady obligation as to any informants that apply to this case. Please see our response to #7.

# Defense Requested Item #6

The People incorporate by reference our response to Requested item #4.

If the court orders the People to run rap sheets on all the witnesses, and turn them over to the defense, we will.

## Defense Requested Item #7

The People intend to comply with our *Brady* obligations as to any informants that apply to this case. There are no informants in regard to percipient witnesses in this case that the People are claiming privileges on. Some of Detective Cordova's gang sources of information are confidential, and he will claim privileges regarding their identities.

# Defense Requested Item #8

The People object to this request as vague and outside our discovery obligations. If any law enforcement official or employee chooses to personally organize their already discovered materials in some way that is convenient for them, I don't think this would fall under our discovery obligations.

## Defense requested Item #9

The People object to this request as outside of our discovery obligations. The People furthermore find no support in Riser, Izazaga, or Brady for this request.

As stated above: (1) Riser does not support defendant's position, (2) the Supreme Court in Littlefield, among others, explains that the prosecution is not required to "gather up everything which might eventually prove useful to the defense," (Littlefield, 5 Cal.4<sup>th</sup> at 135) and (3) 1054 does not require prosecution to gather facts not within knowledge of prosecution team and 1054.5 precludes the defense from inventing new discovery obligations.

# Defense Requested Item # 10

The People object to this request as outside our discovery obligations, and this attorney finds no support for this request in the *Riser* case, nor the *Izazaga* case.

As stated above: (1) Riser does not support defendant's position, (2) the Supreme Court in Littlefield, among others, explains that the prosecution is not required to "gather up everything which might eventually prove useful to the defense," (Littlefield, 5 Cal.4<sup>th</sup> at 135) and (3) 1054 does not require prosecution to gather facts not within knowledge of prosecution team and 1054.5 precludes the defense from inventing new discovery obligations.

# Defense Requested Item #11

The People object to this request as outside our discovery obligations. We have complied with it as to the Woodland Police Department, as that is the agency where the assigned gang expert works. It is irrelevant what other agencies, including the Yolo County Sheriff's Department, has as far as policies for classifying gang members. This defense in this case has been notified that according to Detective Ron Cordova, the assigned case gang expert, he has found no documentation at the Yolo County Sheriff's Department validating Marco Topete specifically as a gang member.


The People find no support in the Riser decision or the Izazaga decision for this request. As stated above: (1) Riser does not support defendant's position, (2) the Supreme Court in Littlefield, among others, explains that the prosecution is not required to "gather up everything which might eventually prove useful to the defense," (Littlefield, 5 Cal.4<sup>th</sup> at 135) and (3) 1054 does not require prosecution to gather facts not within knowledge of prosecution team and 1054.5 precludes the defense from inventing new discovery obligations.

# Defense Requested Item #12

The People object to this request as outside our discovery obligations as far as the request goes to the Yolo County Sheriff's Department.

I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is correct.

Executed on November 25, 2009, at Woodland, California.



GARRETT HAMILTON/173423 DEPUTY DISTRICT ATTORNEY

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# SUPERIOR COURT NO. 08-3355

#### PROOF OF SERVICE

I, RACHEL HUNTER, declare that I am a resident of the County of Yolo; I am over the age of eighteen years and not a party to the within entitled action; my business address is 301 Second Street, Woodland, California 95695.

On November 20, 2009, I served the within PEOPLE'S OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT'S NOTICED MOTION FOR PRETRIAL DISCOVERY COMPLIANCE on counsel for defendant in this action, by placing a true copy thereof enclosed in a sealed envelope and deposited the same at the Yolo County Mail Room for posting this business day, in the United States mail at Woodland, California, addressed to the counsel of record in this action, as follows:

THOMAS PURTELL
ATTORNEY AT LAW
430 3rd St
Woodland, CA 95695

HAYS GABLE III
ATTORNEY AT LAW
428 J St, Ste 354
Sacramento, CA 95814

I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.

Executed on November 20, 2009, at Woodland, California

RACHEL HUNTER